

THE WINSTON CHURCHILL MEMORIAL TRUST

Report on the findings from the Churchill Fellowship study into aspects of command and control of terrorist and high risk situations, counter terrorist training, IT support to support tactical units at terrorist incidents and how to deal with suicide bombers.

**Inspector Robert Waugh
2004 Churchill Fellow
Officer in Charge
Special Emergency Response Team
Queensland Police Service**

By agreement this report is not for publication other than the Executive Summary. The content of this report is to be distributed upon request to the author.

I warrant that this report is original and does not infringe the copyright of any person, or contain anything which is, or the incorporation of which into this report is actionable, for defamation, a breach of any privacy law or obligation, breach of confidence, contempt of court, passing-off or contravention of any other right or of any law.

Signed

Dated

Table of Contents

1.	Executive Summary	4
2.	Outline of the Fellowship	7
3.	Scope	7
4.	Limitations	7
5.	Findings	9
5.1	London	9
5.1.1	Overview	9
5.1.2	Command and control	10
5.1.3	Counter terrorist training	14
5.1.4	IT support	17
5.1.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	17
5.1.6	Conclusion	18
5.2	Belfast	19
5.2.1	Overview	19
5.2.2	Command and control	20
5.2.3	Counter terrorist training	21
5.2.4	IT support	22
5.2.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	23
5.2.6	Conclusion	24
5.3	Tel Aviv	25
5.3.1	Overview	25
5.3.2	Command and control	28
5.3.3	Counter terrorist training	29
5.3.4	IT support	31
5.3.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	32
5.3.6	Conclusion	34
5.4	Madrid	35
5.4.1	Overview	35
5.4.2	Command and control	36
5.4.3	Counter terrorist training	36
5.4.4	IT support	37
5.4.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	38
5.4.6	Conclusion	39
5.5	FBI	40
5.5.1	Overview	40
5.5.2	Command and control	40
5.5.3	Counter terrorist training	41
5.5.4	IT support	42
5.5.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	43
5.5.6	Conclusion	43

5.6	New York	43	
	5.6.1	Overview	43
	5.6.2	Command and control	44
	5.6.3	Counter terrorist training	47
	5.6.4	IT support	47
	5.6.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	48
	5.6.6	Conclusion	49
5.7	Los Angeles	50	
	5.7.1	Overview	50
	5.7.2	Command and control	50
	5.7.3	Counter terrorist training	51
	5.7.4	IT support	52
	5.7.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	52
	5.7.6	Conclusion	52
5.8	Hong Kong	52	
	5.8.1	Overview	52
	5.8.2	Command and control	53
	5.8.3	Counter terrorist training	54
	5.8.4	IT support	55
	5.8.5	Dealing with suicide attacks	55
	5.8.6	Conclusion	56
6.	Conclusions for Australia	56	
	6.1	Command and control	56
	6.2	Counter terrorist training	63
	6.3	IT support	64
	6.4	Dealing with suicide attacks	65
7.	Recommendations.	67	

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From late September to early December 2004 Inspector Robert Waugh of the Queensland Police Special Emergency Response Team travelled to England, Northern Ireland, Israel, Spain, the United States and Hong Kong and visited the major police tactical groups that deal with counter terrorism and high-risk incidents in their respective countries.

During the course of this study each unit was observed in relation to their methodologies, equipment and tactics in the course of their duties.

The conclusion of this study was that the senior Australian Police Tactical Groups are well positioned in relation to their training and preparedness for responding to terrorism and other high-risk incidents. However there is room for improvement in relation to decision making, log taking, method of entry techniques and the training of commanders. This is of significance when dealing with the emerging issue of suicide bombers who pose a unique threat to societies.

There is an urgent need for Australian PTG's to develop tactics and skills to respond to suicide bombers. This report recognises that the opportunity for PTG to confront suicide bombers may be small but the consequence of failure will be catastrophic for a western democracy.

This report will also recognise the value of international liaison to support the continual improvement of contemporary police service strategies and the role the Winston Churchill Trust has played to support this practice.

The major lessons learnt from this study included;

- The need for continual improvement of border protection as a key defence against terrorist attacks.

- The need for committed intelligence operations to be conducted to identify terrorist activities within Australia.
- The need for a review of the national counter terrorist exercise program to be undertaken to re-define the objectives and ensure they are delivering quality training and learning outcome to the jurisdictions. Could include such amendments as no-notice exercises and the embedding of exercise intelligence in live intelligence and database systems.
- The need for jurisdictional Counter Terrorist Coordination Units to examine the role of the private security sector and its potential to be a strategic partner and a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism.
- The need to examine the British Gold Silver Bronze command system.
- The need for Australian jurisdictional command training to incorporate training in regard to the importance of contemporaneous operational logs to include notes detailing decision making, alternate options and the reasons for decisions.
- The need to practice immediate post blast operations for the detection of secondary devices and to integrate bomb responses into the emergency services response.
- The need for the national Bomb Technicians Forum to examine the introduction of electronic counter measure technology as a standard practice in bomb render safe operations.
- That the jurisdictional Bomb Squads development of skills to render safe large vehicle bombs
- The critical need for jurisdictions to be funded for modern live fire counter terrorist training facilities.

- The need for jurisdictions develop tactics to interdict against an imminent suicide attack.
- The need for jurisdictions or the NCTC fund the study to understand Islamic extremist terrorism and to develop tactical and negotiation strategies to deal with such Islamic extremist terrorism.
- That jurisdictions or the NCTC aggressively pursue technology to support the detention of terrorist and void the use of explosives. For example ECM; and the incapacitation by sound and light or sophmonic gases.
- That Australian PTG's move to have dedicated non operational training officers attached to their groups to optimise the efficiency of training.

R.W.WAUGH
INSPECTOR, OFFICER IN CHARGE
SPECIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

Phone 07-32748361 E-mail waugh.robertw@police.qld.gov.au

