



The Winston Churchill Memorial Trust of Australia.

2013 Fellowship

Topic:

'To travel to the United Kingdom and the United States of America in order to identify and/or undertake specialised training in the development and execution of integrity testing in policing'

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Signed

Narelle Willingham

Dated: 29/08/2014

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Introduction

Corruption has plagued policing throughout the world for centuries. The capacity and the capability for police to effectively identify, investigate and prevent corruption have been problematic. Policing agencies are now recognising and emphasising the need to deal with corruption and misconduct through prevention, detection and exposing the identified behaviours. The allocation of additional and specialised resources has enabled corruption investigation to make significant enhancements and the implementation of effective covert investigative techniques, along with proactive strategies has enhanced the resilience of an organisation to repeal or reduce corruption (corruption hardening).

This Churchill Fellowship will enable policing in Australasia to ensure that corruption investigation techniques are contemporary, effective and on a par with our international colleagues. Identifying best practice and contemporaneous training methodologies in the pursuit of effective and appropriate corruption hardening techniques and corruption investigation practices is the foundation of this fellowship. Integrity testing methodologies have been identified by numerous Commissions and International Anti-Corruption Authorities as being a necessary, effective and efficient practice in which to identify corruption whilst also ensuring deterrent. The New York Police Department (NYPD) commenced integrity testing in the 1970's as a result of a recommendation made by the Knapp Commission into corruption within the NYPD. The NYPD are considered the founders of a permanent and ongoing integrity-testing regime, conducting both targeted and random testing. The Metropolitan Police Service, London (MPS) has included targeted integrity testing in their anti-corruption programs since (1995) and has developed a very sound and successful methodology.

As the Chairperson for the Australian New Zealand Police Advisory Agency Integrity Testing Working Group (ANZPAA ITWG), this fellowship will enable me to identify contemporary training methodologies and practices relating to integrity testing and other related anti-corruption practices, and share these

learning's within our community of practice. The methodologies surrounding integrity testing are confidential, in accordance with commitments made to both the MPS and the NYPD, will not be revealed in a public document. Instead, a full presentation will be made to the ANZPAA ITWG as committed within the Churchill fellowship application process. This document will detail only what is already publicly reported and available through open source research, information regarding integrity testing, both within the NYPD and the MPS.

I would like to acknowledge Assistant Commissioner Emmett Dunne (Victoria Police) and Detective Superintendent Clive Rust and Adrian White (Victoria Police) for their support, encouragement and assistance in the Churchill Fellowship application process.

I would like to thank and acknowledge the support of my wonderful husband Craig Willingham, and daughter, Emily, for their love, guidance and enduring support.

Executive Summary

I am currently the Officer in Charge of the Victoria Police Integrity Testing Unit. I have held this position for the past 4 years. My address and title are:

Detective Inspector Narelle Beer
Professional Standards Command
637 Flinders Street,
Melbourne. Victoria. 3004.

My Churchill Fellowship enabled me to travel to the United Kingdom in order to meet with the Integrity Testing Unit within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). The MPS is considered an industry leader within the integrity testing field and specifically conducts targeted integrity tests. A definition of targeted integrity testing is detailed within the context of this document. My priority was to establish if the MPS had developed/were developing an integrity testing training course or program in which I could access and adopt for use within Australian policing jurisdictions. Additionally, the identification of covert investigative techniques for use within and to enhance and/or compliment the success of integrity testing was also sought. I also wanted to identify contemporary corruption hardening practices (those practices which enhance resistance and resilience against corruption) and processes that could be adopted and implemented within home agencies. I then travelled to the United States of America where I visited the New York Police Department (NYPD). The NYPD are considered pioneers in developing integrity testing and conduct both targeted and random testing regimes as a core function of their anti-corruption strategy. Again I sought to identify any integrity testing specific training programs and any related strategies to adopt and return to Australia.

The MPS provided valuable information in relation to the development of a current integrity testing training program, soon to be conducted for the newly established Scottish Police Force (a number of individual Scottish policing agencies have combined to form a single policing body). Chief Inspector Taverner (MPS), a subject matter expert, is the author of this program and is willing to allow me to share this highly confidential program with the ANZPAA ITWG. An objective of the ANZPAA ITWG is to develop a training program pertaining to integrity testing which will enable the group to develop standardised training across all jurisdictions allowing for effective interoperability and cooperation between agencies. Further, a number of contemporary and innovative anti corruption strategies have been identified for consideration of the ANZPAA ITWG as well as the Assistant Commissioner, Professional Standards Command, Victoria Police.

As the chair of the ANZPAA ITWG, the information I have gained will be presented to all ITWG members, including a full precise of training opportunities and processes, as well as the contemporary covert investigative techniques identified. As part of my commitment to MPS and the NYPD, all integrity testing methodologies *will remain protected and will only be disseminated through the ANZPAA ITWG*. For this reason, no methodology or covert practices will be discussed in this public report.

Programme

Metropolitan Police Service, London, United Kingdom.

- Detective Chief Inspector Andy Taverner
Directorate of Professional Standards – Deputy Commissioners
Portfolio
- David Perryman,
High Tech Crime Unit – Corruption
- Stuart Trail,
Risk Management Unit
- Name withheld,
Source Unit.
- Name Withheld
Financial Investigation Unit
- Name withheld
Integrity Test Unit

New York Police Department, Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB), United States.

- Inspector Donald P. Lyons
Commanding Officer,
Administration.
- Captain (Name withheld)
Commanding Officer – Integrity Testing Unit.
- Lieutenant (name withheld)
IAB Intelligence Section.
- Detective (name withheld)
IAB Training Unit

NB: A detailed list of the above contacts will be supplied to the ANZPAA ITWG.

Main Body – Context

Integrity Testing

Integrity testing is a methodology used to investigate corruption. Initially developed by the NYPD in the 1970's, an integrity test is described as the creation of a situation whereby the actions and behaviours of the members involved in the situation are monitored. Homel (1997) describes Integrity testing as placing employees in situations that have been constructed in such a way that a clear opportunity to behave in a dishonest, negligent, or otherwise improper manner is available. The essential purpose of integrity testing is to add the element of surveillance, without inducing or enticing a person to act improperly. Therefore, the integrity test is an artificial environment created by investigators to generate a reaction by the subject of the test. The principle of the integrity test involves placing an individual in a stimulated environment where corrupt behaviour can occur, and then observing the individual's behaviour. The stimulated environment is designed to test whether the subject member will respond in a manner that is illegal, unethical or otherwise in contravention of the required standards of integrity.

When developing an integrity test, there can be no influence which would or could motivate the subject member to behave in any given manner; rather, the situation should enable a free and independent decision by the subject member. The recording of this behaviour/choice can provide conclusive evidence should the subject member commit a criminal offence or perform an act which would be considered as serious misconduct.

Ideally, the situations and opportunities used in integrity testing are indistinguishable from those occurring normally. Most agencies where integrity testing is practiced partake in targeted integrity testing with a view to identify criminal behaviour or serious misconduct. Some agencies, such as the NYPD undertake a very active integrity testing program which includes both targeted and random testing.

A targeted integrity test is intelligence based and targets individuals or groups suspected of engaging in corrupt behaviour. A targeted integrity test should be developed as a result of intelligence or evidence of corrupt activities, and the test should reflect the behaviours reported. Hence, a targeted test is intelligence generated and specifically targets individuals or groups and the identified behaviours associated. Targeted testing is generally utilised for serious misconduct or criminal matters and involves creating a situation or scenario based around the same circumstances of the allegations against the subject member. A random integrity test is not identified or based on any prior behaviour rather; a random integrity test is created to deter unacceptable behaviour by testing routine situations and recording the reaction of the officers involved within this test. Random testing is generally used to identify minor misconduct and disciplinary offences and, in the case of NYPD, used as a tool to identify training needs and skill gaps.

It is appropriate at the earliest opportunity to acknowledge that integrity testing is merely a covert investigative technique that should be used when considering all investigative techniques in the investigation of a crime. For this reason it is not appropriate to consider integrity testing as a stand alone operation and therefore 'quotas' (i.e., an agreed number of tests conducted within a specified time frame) and statistics pertaining to integrity testing are both unproductive and misleading. Integrity testing is merely a tool or methodology available within covert investigation practices. Not all corruption investigations will avail themselves to the use of an integrity test and other covert methodologies may be identified as being more effective. Subsequently, this fellowship has reinforced that it is not the current practice of any integrity testing unit to identify quotas for conducting tests, instead the focus is placed on the covert investigations and the success of those investigations and this is considered 'best practice'. Further, no policing agency currently undertaking integrity testing provides public (or internal) reporting pertaining to the number of tests conducted.

Random integrity testing is not practiced at all in any of the Australian jurisdictions. There has been significant criticism (KPMG, 1996) of a random testing regime, which has been supported by argument put forward within the Wood Royal Commission, in a detailed KPMG report (1995) to the New York City Commission to Combat Police Corruption (CCCPC), as well as other sources. Prenzler (2012) does not support a random integrity testing regime, and comments that within the Australian landscape, the Union movement is highly critical of any random testing and publically and actively would identify the lack of support for the implementation of such a regime. Fundamentally, integrity testing is a very expensive exercise (when considered in isolation, i.e. can be resource intensive, albeit for a very limited timeframe) and unless it is targeted and tailored, the value of the test could be hard to justify or measure (KPMG, 1995). When a targeted integrity test is conducted and finically evaluated against a traditional corruption investigation, inevitably, the cost of the test is considerable lower that the traditional investigation due to shortened timeframes, conclusive outcomes and compellable evidence.

The KPMG report makes much of the fact that the 'hit rate' with random testing in New York City is very low. Perhaps this low rate can be attributed to a high level of integrity and therefore supports the argument that targeted testing is more productive? The KPMG (1995) argued that the difficulties involved in creating realistic scenarios for random testing has significantly contributed to the low success rates associated with random testing. This report (KPMG, 1995) further detailed that in the first 6 months of 1996, 826 random tests were conducted involving 1,811 officers. These resulted in one criminal failure (commission of a criminal offence) that was not prosecuted. The decision to prosecute random integrity tests rest with the District Attorneys office after an evaluation of the circumstances. No explanation was provided as to why a decision to not prosecute was made in this specific instance. When procedural failures were also counted in 1996, there were 7 failures out of 762 officers tested. Thus, the failure rate for criminal offences was only 0.06 percent.

Random integrity testing is not seen as an effective use of resources and therefore is not utilised in Victoria Police. Targeted, intelligence led integrity tests are conducted throughout the Australasian integrity testing agencies. Porter and Prenzler (2012, p 229) recognise that member morale and trust in the organisation are important aspects recognised by most policing jurisdictions. Most police forces agreed that strategies such as random integrity testing can undermine trust, and therefore, should not be used by police. Targeted testing is able to tailor specific testing incidents to particularised suspected behaviour.

Exploiting the suspects' propensity for a particular type of behaviour and setting up a scenario around that identified type of behaviour, ensures that the allegations are adequately tested whilst avoiding the potential for arguments around entrapment - whereby legal argument could be made pertaining to a coercion to engage in a particular manner. (Prenzler and Porter, 2012). Integrity testing is considered a significant deterrent to unethical behaviour (Prenzler, 1999) and serves to enhance the range and application of investigative options available to investigators in conducting effective corruption investigations. Despite there being no defence of entrapment, within the Australian legal systems, fairness and natural justice are paramount considerations in the design and implementation of any integrity test. The legality of integrity testing and related covert practices within Australia has been upheld in the courts as part of the contractual rights of employers, within certain bounds of privacy and within the area of an employee's responsibilities (Cozzetto and Pedeliski, 1997).

The legality of integrity tests in Australia has been supported at law by the high court in rejecting a defence of entrapment in a drug case. It was recognised that: *State Supreme Courts [and]. . . the courts of England, Canada and New Zealand have denied the existence of such a substantive common law defence . . . (A)n offender does not escape liability (for his or her actions) merely because he was induced to commit the offence by another, whether the other be a friend, a business associate or a member of a police force (Ridgeway v. The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19).*

Integrity testing has become an accepted methodology for the investigation of serious misconduct and criminality. In fact, integrity testings has been a major recommendation made as a result of Commissions into police corruption over the past two decades. The NSW Wood Royal Commission concluded that policing *“is so filled with operational and ethical dilemmas that temptation should not be placed in the way of an officer, unless reasonable cause exists to test that person’s integrity”* (Wood, 1997, pp. 511-12). Most police agencies across Australia have specific legislative capability to undertake integrity testing and Federal legislation enacted in July, 2013, enabled federal policing and enforcement agencies to undertake integrity testing as part of covert investigations into corruption. The current policy of police services in Australia is to support targeted testing only (ANZPAA ITWG).

Targeted testing has been shown to be successful in exposing corruption in a number of jurisdictions. Targeted testing became accepted as an essential anti-corruption tool by key stakeholders in policing in NSW; including the union, who argued it provided a means to remove officers who betrayed their colleagues and also to address public distrust of police (Newton, 1997). New South Wales Police reported that in 1992, of 90 covert corruption investigations whereby targeted integrity tests were conducted, 37 per cent identified misconduct, 27 per cent showed no misconduct, 12 per cent were forwarded on for further investigations and 24 per cent were inconclusive or were discontinued. The ‘failed’ tests (where members behaved corruptly) led to 51 criminal charges being laid: 54 per cent against police, 23 per cent against police staff and 23 per cent against civilians (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001)

In recognising that integrity testing is merely a covert investigative tool, Homel (1997) and Goldsmith (2001), argue that effective anti corruption strategies should ensure that the capability for integrity testing is imbedded in a broad management strategy for the prevention of misconduct.

Further, in order to ensure the success of an integrity testing regime, the processes and practices must be accepted, supported and implemented by Police. This has occurred in a number of states within Australia in partnership with an oversight body. The NYPD program has been incorporated into a departmental philosophy endorsed by the Commissioner and has support of unions – “Responsibility for corruption prevention permeates the organisation at all levels, including the union” (Giuliani & Brattan, 1995).

Given the cohesive and co-operative partnerships existing between the ANZPAA ITWG memberships, consistent messaging and communication pertaining to the development and conduct of integrity tests is paramount. The interoperability (ability for a number of policing jurisdictions to work autonomously on an investigation or within other jurisdictions) of the ITWG membership ensures that all stakeholders must have agreed and standardised processes. It is this interoperability and co-operation that has driven the need to identify standardised training and contemporary practices and processes from the world leaders in integrity testing – NYPD and MPS. The community of practice of this specialised covert methodology within Australasia want to ensure that current practices and policies are contemporary, innovative and leading edge to ensure the effective and efficient investigation of police corruption.

The Metropolitan Police Service, London

Details to be presented throughout this document pertaining to the MPS have been derived from open source data and clearly attributed to relevant authors. This stance is in line with the commitment made to MPS that any information pertaining to integrity testing will not be released in a public forum.

The Metropolitan Police Service, London, comprises of over 41,700 members. The service currently has over 31000 sworn police members, 13000 civilian staff, 2,600 Police Community Support Officers and 5,100 volunteer police members.

The MPS covers 620 square miles of geography with a residential population of 7.2 million and is the largest policing organisation in the United Kingdom.

Integrity testing has been conducted within the MPS for over two decades. A recommendation (Recommendation 10) made by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) regarding police integrity stated that "*all forces should secure the proactive capacity to maintain integrity and high professional standards*" This policy sets out the rationale behind integrity testing and defines parameters and conditions for its use within the MPS. Consequently, the MPS has developed a highly efficient and skilled integrity testing capability as part of a wider anti-corruption and dishonesty prevention strategy. MPS Deputy Commission John Stevens (1999) described this strategy as 'acknowledged as the best in the world'. Stevens describes the MPS approach to corruption as 'dynamic and innovative, using all the traditional methods, with some new ideas, that are used against organised crime.

This includes electronic surveillance and intelligence gathering, use of informants, conventional surveillance, observations and persuading criminals to give evidence against their criminal police accomplices'. Fundamentally, integrity testing was simply a new methodology included to compliment a range of covert investigation techniques. The MPS do not identify 'quotas' with regard to conducting tests, nor do they publically or internally report on any aspect of the integrity testing regime.

The MPS have a comprehensive suite of anti corruption investigative techniques upon which to rely, integrity testing is merely one of these options. MPS target and pursue corrupt officers as part of the overall strategy which also includes targeting the corrupters. This aspect ensure that the MPS are leaders within the corruption hardening field and provides another dimension for consideration by this author when reporting to ANZPAA and my home jurisdiction. The MPS (Stevens, 1999) reports that there has been significant success in the enhanced use of covert investigative techniques, including the use of integrity testing which has resulted in the jailing of prominent criminals

for lengthy custodial sentences who involve themselves in police corruption. Stevens, (1999) advocates that whilst deterring officers from behaving corruptly, the ability to also discouraging criminals from seeking to corrupt members is paramount in the fight against corruption. Such successes, argues Stevens (1999) preserves and ensures the focus of the Professional Standards Department, whilst maintaining morale and integrity across the Force.

Stevens reported to the 9th International Anti-corruption Conference in Africa (1999) that as a result of the implementation of integrity testing and the comprehensive covert investigative capabilities, investigations resulted in 65 persons being charged over a 12 month period. This included 27 police officers, 12 ex-police officers and 26 other persons, ranging from customs officials, lawyers, members of the Crown Prosecution service to members of the criminal fraternity. At the time of this report, Stevens commented that a further 30 people were on bail pending decisions by the Crown Prosecution Service to charge. These are remarkable results.

The MPS engage in targeted integrity testing practices. It is noted that the HMIC report (1999) supported a limited use of random 'quality assurance tests' aimed as specific issues other than corruption such as racism, sexism and neglect of crime victims, however, these processes are not facilitated within the integrity testing arena, nor are they considered to be a random integrity test.

It is appropriate to consider the overall MPS Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy in order to understand the scope and the interdependencies of the processes and practices. This strategy (Stevens, 1999) had 6 major strands, which are simply summarised as follows:-

- Strand 1 - Inclusion – There is a significant responsibility upon leaders in the organisation to identify and manage misconduct and corruption within the workplace. In the past, there was a practice of failing to

openly and transparently discuss misconduct and/or corruption or the investigation of this within the workplace or with workplace managers. This excluded managers, and removed their ability to actively manage and supervise these issues.

- Strand 2 - Security screening and vetting – The improvement of systems and processes to ensure personnel recruited into the organisation are of the highest standard and integrity. Further, vetting processes (including background checks, vetting of family and associate friends and relatives) for the appointment of personnel into sensitive and high risk work locations was implemented. The MPS Policy Board implemented a management vetting system which sought to identify vulnerable staff and those whose integrity may have been in question.
- Strand 3 - Prevention and detection - to increase the certainty of detection by ensuring that there is always an intelligence led and capable response to corruption.

Stevens identifies integrity testing as a highly effective tool which, when based on an intelligence to enable targeted testing, create situations in which corrupt officers, who wish to act unlawfully, can do so whilst enabling the collection of the best possible evidence. It was initially thought that there would be some value in the implementation of random integrity tests. The deterrent value associated with the random nature of this testing would enhance fears that if acting improperly or corruptly the likelihood of detection would be significantly increased. Additionally, it was anticipated that random testing would provide an ethical audit of the MPS. The benefits associated with random integrity testing, when considered with the costs and other disadvantages, resulted in the abolishment of random testing but an introduction of the aforementioned quality assurance audits (page 15).

- Strand 4 - Supervision and leadership – leadership failure or inaction was identified as a significant factor in a lack of integrity within workplaces. As a result, the MPS developed a substantial leadership

programme to support leaders in order that they can identify, challenge and deal with corruption. This included a system of supervision which is more intrusive and prescriptive.

- Strand 5 - Focus and accountability – Effective and active governance and accountability regimes were identified as being crucial.
- Strand 6 - Corruption and dishonesty proofing – to continually monitor policies, practices and procedures to ensure they reduce opportunities for corruption and dishonesty.

This strategy was fundamental in the effort to focus on corruption hardening processes.

The support, assistance and co-operation I received from the MPS, in particular from Chief Inspector Andy Taverner, was outstanding. As a result of the unfettered access I was given, many opportunities for enhancement of current practices and processes, and the development of new initiatives were recognised and will be disseminated via the ANZPAA ITWG and my home policing jurisdiction. Specialised training opportunities were identified and will be reported to the ANZPAA ITWG.

The New York Police Department

The New York Police Department (NYPD) comprises of over 38,000 members. Currently, the NYPD is made up of 34,450 sworn members, 4,500 auxiliary police officers, 5000 School Safety Agents, 2,300 Traffic Enforcement Agencies and 370 Traffic Enforcement Supervisors. The Transit Police and the Housing Police Departments amalgamated with the NYPD in 1994, further enhancing the size and capability of NYPD. Consequently, the NYPD has the largest municipal police union in the United States, representing over 50,000 active and retired NYC police officers. The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) has strength of 600 officers.

There has been a continual history of a cycle of corruption within the NYPD. The Knapp Commission (1970) was a major commission into corruption within the NYPD and identified that organised crime, 'favours for friends' and the acceptance of gratuities were the major causations of corruption. A later investigation, the Mollen Commission (1994) identified that the most prevalent forms of corruption within the NYPD consisted of police engaging in criminal acts, specifically acts surrounding the drug trade. As a result, the Mollen Commission made recommendations in relation to the following areas:

- Police culture and management;
- Command accountability;
- Internal investigations;
- Sanctions and deterrents;
- Community outreach; and
- Independent external oversight.

The anti-corruption strategy adopted by NYPD was based on three concepts (Corruption Prevention and Education Unit, 1997) as follows;

- An effective internal affairs function to serve as a deterrent to corruption, brutality and serious misconduct;
- Re-engineering of the key organisational systems, especially in the areas of supervision, training and discipline;
- The construction of systems of external accountability and partnership to establish a bond of trust between the police and the public.

As part of the anti-corruption strategies introduced into the NYPD as a result of the Knapp and Mollen Commissions, was the introduction of integrity testing. The NYPD conduct two types of integrity tests, those being:

- Targeted testing in which an identified officer is the subject of a particular allegation;
- Random testing which is not directed at a particular individual but addresses a corruption trend identified (Corruption Prevention and Education Unit, 1997).

There were four objectives of the NYPD integrity testing program, which are:

1. Create additional anti-corruption tools in an effort to identify and catch corrupt officers;
2. create a message of corruption which will assist in the analysis of corruption within the NYPD;
3. establish a sense of omnipresence within the NYPD with the goal of having members of the service handle each assignment as if it were an integrity test; and
4. identify training needs and communicate these needs for an appropriate follow up.

The following statistics have been obtained from a public document (Corruption Prevention and Education Unit, 1997). No current NYPD data pertaining to integrity tests will be identified in this paper. NYPD do not reveal how many tests are conducted annually and therefore, the following figures are somewhat historic. The NYPD IAB only reveals integrity testing numbers and statistics directly to the Commissioner, NYPD. The following figures were provided when KPMG were appointed to review integrity testing and are not differentiated into divisions or agencies.

In 1995, 1,222 officers were tested during 565 different tests. Eleven members of the service failed integrity tests and their service was terminated. In 1996, 707 tests were conducted involving 1,320 officers. The number of failures was 24. The Commission to Combat Police Corruption conducted a review of the effectiveness of the NYPD integrity testing program and this review resulted in the recommendation (which was followed) to increase the percentage of targeted tests and reduce the number of random tests conducted. It was established by the Commission that not all of the objectives were being met through random integrity tests.

I was advised that currently, within NYPD, both random and targeted tests are still being conducted. I am further led to believe that random integrity testing is conducted in greater numbers than targeted testing due to cost and ease.

Henry (1990) reports that random testing in the NYPD was initially accompanied by outrage from officers, however, members came to accept it as a necessary evil to prevent corruption and protect the police reputation. Random integrity testing in NYPD has provided a significant deterrent value with some NYPD police reporting that they attend each task as if it may be an integrity test.

Whilst NYPD is one of the only jurisdictions to conduct random integrity tests, it is also unique in that no specific legislation has been enacted to support or enable this testing. I was advised that 'local government policy' was the structure which enabled the conduct of the tests. In fact, this local government policy also enables the NYPD to conduct both random and targeted integrity testing on any government employee. Therefore, the NYPD routinely (as requested) conduct integrity tests on the New York Fire Department personnel, Local Garbage and Waste employees and all other government employees. Prior to the conduct of any targeted test, the NYPD develop the test in consultation with the New York District Attorneys office, however, given that most random tests are conducted relating to discipline procedures, this legal advice is not required.

I have been provided with extremely valuable advice and assistance in the identification, preparation and execution of both targeted and random testing methodologies currently utilised within the NYPD, and in accordance with my commitment and undertaking to ensure the covert nature of these methodologies are maintained, this will not be discussed outside of the ANZPAA ITWG. I will continue to support the ANZPAA ITWG commitment to conduct only targeted testing within Australian jurisdictions.

The NYPD also enabled my access to all major units within the IAB. These units detailed their roles, responsibilities and objectives as they each form part of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. Numerous ideas and processes which are both relevant and adaptable to the Australian policing jurisdictions have been identified and will be presented to the ANZPAA ITWG.

Of note (and publicly available) is the acknowledgement and reward for those police officers who have been identified with a high level of integrity. Newham (2003) reports that the Integrity Review Board meets periodically to determine which officers have found to display a high level of integrity (potentially through having repeatedly passing random integrity tests).

The officers who have been identified as having demonstrated a high level of integrity are brought before the 'board' and are then offered 'choice' assignments or transfers that could lead to promotions into more senior positions. No financial or tangible rewards are offered, but the acknowledgement of their integral behaviour is recognised and therefore promoted. The on-flow effect from this strategy is that other officers identify with rewards for outstanding behaviours.

Lessons learnt

Please note that I will provide a simple and broad overview of my findings. I will not provide any commentary, in this forum, on any covert methodology or process. A full and comprehensive briefing will be provided to the ANZPAA ITWG with specific recommendations for consideration of approval at the national level.

There is clear and undeniable evidence to support the inclusion of targeted integrity testing processes into a comprehensive police anti-corruption strategy. The extensive and successful implementation of an integrity testing regime internationally, in policing agencies across the United States of America, the United Kingdom and many European Union countries, provides significant support as to the effectiveness and appropriateness of this strategy. Whilst corruption will never (in any environment) be eliminated, the ability to effectively investigate corruption is paramount and integrity testing provides an additional covert tool to enable this to occur.

Targeted integrity testing is a very effective covert investigative technique that can be used to test the integrity of subject officers whilst also providing additional benefits within the intelligence collection field. The use of a random integrity testing regime in the Australasian environment would be problematic and, I suggest, ineffectual in the investigation of serious corruption and criminality.

The identification of a number of anti-corruption practices both within the MPS and the NYPD will be documented and provided to the ANZPAA ITWG and Victoria Police for awareness and consideration for the potential implementation within current practices to further enhance our anti-corruption strategies.

Conclusion

Policing and law enforcement agencies around the world are continually combating corruption. The advancement of technology, the diminishment of geographical boundaries and borders, the enhanced need for cooperation, information sharing and knowledge management between agencies is now critical. This fellowship enabled me to connect with world leaders in the fight against police corruption. The development of networks between like agencies across the world will become essential in the detection, identification and investigation of corruption and serious crime.

The enhancement of integrity testing skills and development is a significant component in the fight against corruption. The defining factor in using integrity testing as a methodology in investigations is the stimulated nature of the scenario which differentiates from traditional anti-corruption investigation tools, which seek to substantiate corrupt behaviour that has already occurred. The inclusion of integrity testing methodologies in covert investigations simply strengthens current techniques and enhances the suite of focused, intelligence driven intervention strategies. Contemporary learning's and the dissemination of this knowledge ensures integrity testing can be effective while providing fairness and protection to all

The investigation of corruption police officers is inherently difficult for many reasons, not least the intimate knowledge the subject member will have with regard to investigative techniques. The ability to identify competent and compellable witnesses to provide evidence against corrupt police is problematic. A properly conducted covert investigation into a corrupt officer's activities, whereby an integrity test is conducted, has shown to be able to withstand scrutiny and achieve very effective outcomes. Integrity testing clearly can enhance the effectiveness of corruption investigations.

Mr Philip Moss, Australian Integrity Commissioner (2013) commented about the aggressive tactics used by organised criminal groups to achieve their aims, as well as the risk of infiltration and corrupt compromise in agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime. Moss identified the problems of the conscious opponent and the invisibility of corruption. Moss acknowledged that it is these phenomena that make it difficult to detect and gather evidence about corrupt conduct in a law enforcement environment. Moss identified the need to enable an integrity testing regime within the federal jurisdiction, and commented that to add integrity testing to the options available to combat corruption, further enhances our ability to effectively investigate corruption. “It (integrity testing) will not be a panacea and it will not be the right method for every agency or in every instance; however, for the right situations, it will be useful to have the ability to conduct integrity testing” stated Moss.

These comments have been not only supported by, but emphasized as a result of my findings on the fellowship. Integrity testing is a very effective methodology to include in the range of investigative techniques available when investigating corruption. The skills and competencies required with regard to the development and implementation of an integrity test are very unique. The need to ensure that Australia remains contemporary and effective in the deployment of these tests is critical in order to remain effective. The identification of relevant and appropriate training for covert investigations, and in particular, integrity testing, will ensure a standardized, effective and enhanced approached to testing throughout Australasia.

Recommendations

A detailed and specific list of recommendations will be presented to the ANZPAA ITWG for consideration of implementation. One of these recommendations relates to the conduct of a specific covert investigative training course which includes integrity testing methodologies. Without specifying the details of this recommendation, I am confident that the objectives of my fellowship have been achieved and will enable an international standard of training and practices to be adopted or enhanced within covert corruption investigations.

Dissemination Strategy

A full and detailed report outlining all learning's and recommendations will be disseminated as follows:

1. ANZPAA ITWG (As the Chairperson)
2. Assistant Commissioner, Professional Standards Command, Victoria Police

I will also avail myself to the Australian Federal Police; Integrity Practitioners Training Course (an international course) whereby learning's obtained will be presented and discussed.

This report does not detail any information that would breach undertakings provided to the generous staff of the MPS and the NYPD.

References

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